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Abstract 
This paper studies the phenomenon of service-led growth in India over the past two decades 
from the perspective of household expenditure. We use consumption expenditure data from 
four recent “thick” rounds of the National Sample Survey in 1993-94, 2004-05, 2009-10 and 
2011-12, and study aggregate services as well as 5 individual categories – education, 
healthcare, transportation, entertainment, and personal services – for both rural India. We 
begin by showing that expenditures of non-rich sections of the population are, and continue to 
remain, a significant source of the demand that has supported growth of the service sector over 
the past two decades. In particular, we show that the bottom 75 percent of households in 
terms of monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) have been the source of between 31 and 54 
percent of total expenditure on services, the larger numbers referring to urban India. Next, we 
show that expenditure on services, as a share of total expenditure, has increased across the 
expenditure distribution, even when we control for expenditure growth over time. For a poor 
country like India with widespread under-nutrition, this presents an unusual trend. We highlight 
the perverse nature of this trend in two ways. First, we estimate bivariate Lowess curves for the 
share of services in monthly expenditure against real MPCE, for rural and urban India 
separately, and show that it has been pivoting in a clockwise direction since 2004-05. Second, 
we confirm this finding by estimating quadratic Engel curves with an instrumental variable 
strategy. The clockwise pivoting of Lowess and Engel curves, especially true for urban India 
since 2004-05, mean that spending patterns of poor households – as captured by the share of 
monthly expenditure devoted to services – increasingly resemble those of the rich, even as 
income differentials persist. This suggests that poorer households are possibly getting 
constrained into spending more on services, even when they have inadequate consumption of 
food, due to larger structural changes beyond their control. 
  
JEL Codes: L80; N35; O53 
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1. Introduction 
In India, the service sector has grown at a rapid pace over the last two decades. While the service 
sector grew faster than agriculture in the three decades after independence, its annual growth 
rate was lower than industry’s by about one percentage point. During the 1980s, the service 
sector’s annual growth rate of 6.6% came close to industry’s growth rate of 6.8% per annum. The 
1990s witnessed the real acceleration, when it clocked an annual growth rate of 7.5%, far 
exceeding industry’s 5.8% (Gordon and Gupta, 2004). This high growth rate has been maintained 
by the service sector ever since. As a consequence, in 2011-12 the service sector accounted for 
about 57% of the economy’s gross value added (at factor cost) (GOI, 2015). Thus, it would not be 
an exaggeration to say that India’s rapid growth in the last two decades has been led by the 
service sector. 
That there is something unusual about this phenomenon of service-led growth 
acceleration in India can be highlighted by a comparison with the historical experience of present-
day developed economies and with a group of economies which are comparable to the 
contemporary Indian economy. In general, developing countries have been undergoing 
“premature deindustrialization” (Rodrik, 2015). This refers to the fact that the share of the 
industrial sector in aggregate output and employment are reaching their peaks at a lower levels 
of per capita income in late industrializing countries, like India, than in early industrializing 
countries. Since agriculture has been declining at the same time, the fall in the industrial sector’s 
share is reflected in a rise in the share of the service sector. In this sense India conforms to a 
global trend. But this trend is a cause for concern. The industrial sector is technologically the most 
dynamic sector and displays unconditional convergence across countries (Rodrik, 2013). 
Moreover, a large industrial sector has historically played a catalytic role in the development of 
an organized working class, mass political parties and democratic institutions (Rodrik, 2015). 
Thus, if developing countries bypass industrialization, they risk ending up with more unequal and 
volatile societies.1  
                                                          
1 In contrast, according to GOI (2015), neither industry nor services was found to have an edge over the other as 
far their potential to transform the economy is concerned.  
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More interestingly, India stands out within the group of present-day developing 
economies too. After controlling for level and growth of income, India was found to be a positive 
outlier in terms of the service sector’s share of GDP (Kochhar et al., 2006). The positive outlier 
status of India has been found in services exports as well (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2012). Not 
surprisingly, industrial performance of India was found to be a negative outlier (Kochhar et al., 
2006). 
Both because it departs from well-known patterns and because of its potential 
implications on poverty, inequality, and welfare, the growth of India’s service sector has attracted 
lot of scholarly attention in recent years (Singh, 2006; Rakshit, 2007; Eichengreen and Gupta, 
2011; Nayyar, 2012). To investigate the cause of its growth, it is useful to conceptually subdivide 
the sources of growth between supply side and demand side factors. Some of the supply side 
factors that have been seen as having helped the growth of the Indian service sector are (a) the 
diversified nature of industrial production, and (b) a skilled workforce. Interestingly, both these 
factors are legacies of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy of the post-
Independence era. The Mahalanobis model of planning – a key organizing framework of ISI 
policies – had a pronounced emphasis on self-sufficiency. As a result, the country chose to 
produce many goods that defied the logic of comparative advantage. For instance, heavy and 
capital intensive industrialization was consciously pursued as part of the ISI strategy (Chakravarty, 
1987; Patnaik, 1994).  
To facilitate heavy and capital intensive industrialization, rapid and widespread skill 
development was necessary. Thus, tertiary education was encouraged as part of the same 
strategy. While critics have taken the Mahalanobis strategy to task for neglecting primary 
education and for not capitalizing on comparative advantage, they have often overlooked some 
of its important unintended consequences. First, India ended up having a high degree of 
diversification in the domestic production basket. Kochhar et al. (2006) found a positive relation 
between the degree of diversification and performance of service sector. Thus the growth of the 
service sector could be partly attributed to this diversification of domestic production. Second, 
the country managed to create a pool of high quality skilled labour. The magnitude of this pool 
may be small compared to the vastness of the economy, but it was large enough to support the 
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growth of key branches of the service sector, like IT and telecommunication, which experienced 
a global upsurge from late 1980s (Kochhar et al., 2006). Thus, curiously enough, the acceleration 
of the service sector in the 1990s in India was aided, albeit unknowingly, by the ISI strategy of 
immediate post-Independence years.    
Turning to the demand side, we can break up the main sources of demand for the output 
of the service sector into four broad categories: (a) demand coming from agriculture and 
industry, (b) export demand, (c) final consumption demand arising from the government (public 
consumption), and (d) final consumption demand coming from households (private 
consumption). The first component is “intermediate demand”; the other three components 
together comprise “final demand”.  
Intermediate demand, i.e., demand for the service sector output that is used as 
intermediate inputs in other sectors will rise if, firstly, other sectors grow at a quicker rate, or, 
secondly, if the intensity of use of service sector inputs rises. Using input-output tables for 1993, 
1998, 2003, Eichengreen and Gupta (2011) found that the intensity of use of service sector inputs 
has not, in general, gone up. On the other hand, we know from aggregate data that the other 
two sectors, namely agriculture and industry, have grown at a slower rate than services (GOI, 
2015). A combination of these two factors means that importance of “intermediate demand” has 
been going down over time. For instance, industrial demand accounted for 40% of the service 
sector output in 1991; it fell to 31% in 2007. For agriculture, the corresponding fall has been from 
5% to 2% (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2011).  
This decline has been largely compensated by the rise in export demand, and the 
combination of public and private consumption demand. Between 1991 and 2007, the share of 
exports as a proportion of service sector output rose from 3% to 10% (Eichengreen and Gupta, 
2011). Sectors within services which benefitted most from external demand are computer-
related services, machinery rental, research, accounting, legal services, technical services, 
communication, banking and other such services. Reflecting this growth of service exports, 
India’s share in world exports of services more than tripled, from 0.8% to 2.6%, in the decade 
since 1998. Going hand in hand with exports, final consumption demand – sum of public and 
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private consumption – has also been rising. From a little over 50% of services output in 1991, it 
rose to approximately 60% in 2007. In this paper we focus on the private component of final 
consumption demand, i.e., household consumption demand. In the context of the 
macroeconomic story of India’s service sector growth, we are interested in investigating the 
behaviour of households as regards the consumption of services. While the bulk of the existing 
literature has analyzed India’s service sector growth from a macroeconomic perspective, the 
main contribution of this paper is to connect the macroeconomic phenomenon to the behaviour 
of households. This paper investigates household level expenditure behaviour to identify an 
important source of demand for the service sector and draws out some implications of such 
behaviour from a distributional perspective. 
Among the extant literature, Nayyar (2012) is closest to our paper. While Nayyar’s (2012) 
primary aim is to establish that services behave like luxuries, the focus of this paper is slightly 
different. In particular, we study the following questions. First, can we see evidence for the 
growth of expenditure on services at the household level? Second, which sections of the 
population are purchasing, and supporting the growth of, services? Is it primarily the relatively 
rich households who are purchasing services? Or, are relatively poorer households also emerging 
as important sources of demand for services? What are the implications of the consumption 
patterns of services across the income distribution? By addressing these questions, this paper 
contributes to the emerging literature on India’s experience of service sector led growth in a 
specific way.  
In this paper, we answer these questions using household level data from four recent 
“thick” rounds of the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CES) conducted by the National Sample 
Survey Organisation (NSSO) of the Government of India, in 1993-94, 2004-05, 2009-10 and 2011-
12. Our analysis of these large scale, nationally representative data sets shows that household 
level expenditure patterns do show a steep increase in the consumption of services. Moreover, 
the increase in the consumption of services is true across the income distribution – poor 
households have increased their consumption of services just like the rich. In fact, expenditure 
arising from the bottom 75 percent of the population – a conservative measure of the 
economically vulnerable section of the population, according to Sengupta et al. (2008) – have 
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become and continues to remain an important source of demand for key services. We also show 
that over time, the behaviour of relatively poorer households increasingly resemble those of the 
rich as far as the consumption of services is concerned. We think this indicates towards the 
operation of perverse structural constraints, of the kind that have contributed to a food budget 
squeeze (Basole and Basu, 2015).      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss data sources and 
definitions of key variables. In section 3, we discuss patterns of consumption of services by 
households to establish that poor households are and continue to remain an important source 
of demand for services. In section 4, we present Lowess plots and estimates of quadratic Engel 
curves to argue that the behaviour of poor households are coming closer to those of richer 
households. Section 5 presents discussion of the results and the last section concludes the 
paper. An appendix provides details of services consumption items available in the CES of the 
NSSO. 
2. Data and Definitions 
The main source of data for the analysis in this paper are the National Sample Surveys (NSS) in 
India, one of the oldest household sample surveys in the world. The NSS is conducted by the 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of the Government of India. While the NSS has 
collected information on a wide range of aspects – like housing, wages, sanitation, health, 
schooling, disability – its two most important components are the consumption expenditure 
survey (CES) and the employment-unemployment survey (EUS). Since 1972-73, the NSS has 
been split into “thick” (or quinquennial) rounds and “thin” rounds. The thick rounds are 
conducted roughly every 5 years, have large samples (about 120,000) and a sampling design 
that ensures its representativeness at sub-national levels. The thin rounds are conducted at a 
roughly annual frequency between the thick rounds, have smaller samples (roughly 40 percent 
of thick rounds) and are representative only at the national level.   
For the analysis in this paper, we use data from the CES of four recent thick rounds: the 
50th, 61st, 66th and 68th rounds of the NSS, which refer to the years 1993-94, 2004-05, 2009-10 
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and 2011-12, respectively.2 The CES collects detailed information on the quantity and value of 
expenditure on a broad range of goods and services, including all important food and nonfood 
categories.3 Data from the CES is used to generate estimates of average monthly per capita 
expenditure (MPCE) and its distribution across households, and has been the mainstay of 
quantitative analyses of poverty and inequality in the country. The focus of this paper is on the 
sources and implications of growth in services. Hence, we extract data on the value of 
expenditure on all categories of services that are available in the CES. Aggregating information 
on expenditure on relevant items, we form 6 broad groups of services expenditure: education, 
healthcare, transportation, entertainment, personal services, and rent.  
In this paper, the category of “education” captures expenditure of households on 
services directly related to education like tuition, fees, library charges and private tutors. But it 
excludes expenditure on goods like textbooks that would also be part of the overall household 
expenditure on education. The category of “healthcare” captures household expenditures on 
services related to healthcare and excludes expenditure on goods like medicines. The category 
of “transportation” includes expenses on conveyance services but excludes expenditure on 
goods like fuel. The category of “entertainment” includes expenditure on cinema, theater, fairs, 
etc., but does not include the purchase of durable goods like radio, TV, etc. The category of 
“personal services” includes expenditures on routine services like domestic servant, sweeper, 
cook, tailor, repair services, telephone (including mobile) charges. The category of “rent” 
includes house rent, garage rent, hotel lodging charges, etc., and is an imputed number for 
urban households who own their houses.4     
While we will conduct some analysis that is disaggregated by the six categories of 
services expenditure, a major aim of this paper will be to study a composite category of 
“services expenditure”. This composite category is computed as the sum of all the categories 
other than rent. Thus, in the rest of this paper, when we refer to “services” expenditure 
                                                          
2 We leave out the 55th round (1999-00) for well-known data problems arising from mixing of recall periods. 
3 For education, health care, transportation, personal services and other “miscellaneous goods and services”, NSSO 
only collects information on the value of consumption. No information on quantity of consumption is collected for 
these categories.   
4 Further details of the construction of services expenditure categories are given in the Appendix. 
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without further qualifications, we will mean the sum of expenditure on education, healthcare, 
transportation, entertainment, and personal services. We exclude rent from the composite 
category for two reasons. First, much of the information on rent for urban households is an 
imputed figure; hence, its reliability is much lower than the expenditure information on other 
categories. Second, expenditure that is recorded as “rent” is a transfer payment. It is not an 
expenditure that correspond to the production of any good or service. Hence, it should be 
excluded from any analysis that refers to the output of services.    
To compute real expenditures, we deflate nominal expenditure by the state-level 
consumer price indices for agricultural labourers (CPIAL) for rural households; for urban 
households, we use the state-level consumer price index for industrial workers (CPIIW). While 
state-level price indices allow us to control for both spatial and temporal changes in prices, we 
face one data issue. State-level CPIAL and CPIIW, going back to 1993-94, are only available for 
the following 15 major states: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, and West Bengal. Together these states, whose data we are using, accounted for 
about 82 percent of Indian households in 2011-12.  
To construct a consistent series for the CPIAL and CPIIW at the state level going back all 
the way to 1987-88, we used data from two sources. For historical data, we used the Economic 
and Political Weekly Research Foundation India Time Series database, and for more recent years 
we used data available in published reports of the Labour Bureau of the Ministry of Labour & 
Employment, Government of India. Using data from both these sources, we constructed time 
series for state-level CPIAL and CPIIW with 1960-61 as the base year. Hence, all real 
expenditures in this paper are expressed in terms of 1960-61 prices.  
 
3. Patterns of Services Consumption 
The growth acceleration of the Indian economy since the early 1990s was largely led by the 
services sector, as has been mentioned above. Between 1993-94 and 2011-12, while real gross 
value added for the whole economy increased by 245%, the corresponding increase for the 
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services sector was 340%. Over the same period, the share of services in real value added 
increased from 45% to 57% (GOI, 2015, Table 1.3 A1).  
An important source of demand underlying this acceleration of the services sector since 
the early 1990s has been final consumption demand arising from household expenditure. While 
there are many categories of services – like finance, insurance, real estate, business services – 
that are not consumed by most households, many key services – like education, healthcare, 
transportation – are part of the consumption basket of households. In this paper, we study 
those services for which expenditure data is available from the CES conducted by the NSSO. As 
pointed out in the previous section, the CES allows us to construct a composite category of 
“services expenditure” comprising of 5 important categories of services: education, healthcare, 
entertainment, personal services, and transportation.  
Between 1993-94 and 2011-12, average inflation-adjusted total monthly per capita 
expenditure increased by 38% in rural and 51% in urban India (NSSO, 2014). Our own 
calculations show that over the same period, inflation-adjusted average monthly per capita 
expenditure on services increased by 167% in rural and 137% in urban India. Thus, household 
expenditure on services increased by more than 3 times faster than total expenditure in both 
rural and urban India. Turning to the five categories, our calculation show that entertainment, 
education and personal services were the three fastest growing expenditure categories in rural 
India. Over the period of study, average expenditure on the first grew by 472%, the second by 
298%, and the third by 197%. In urban India, these three services were also the fastest growing 
expenditure categories for households, but the order of increase was different: entertainment 
grew by 382%, personal services by 209% and education by 170%.  
Given these overall patterns of household expenditure on services, we would like to 
probe deeper and investigate two sets of questions. First: did the contribution of the rich to the 
demand for services rise over time? Second: have households been devoting an increasing 
share of their monthly budget on services, and can income growth account for the observed 
pattern?  
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3.1. Are Poor Households Purchasing Services? 
The first question we wish to investigate relates to a common perception that most of the final 
demand for services that come from households are limited to expenditure made by relatively 
richer households. To address this question, Table 1 reports estimates of the proportion of per 
capita expenditure on the 5 categories of services and their sum, that come from the bottom 
75% of the MPCE distribution in each year. We choose 75% of the population because, to our 
mind, this is a meaningful estimate of the poor in India. In fact, this is close to, and a little lower 
than, the estimate of the economically vulnerable population in 2004-05 presented by 
Sengupta et al. (2008). 
Table 1: Proportion of Per Capita Total Expenditure on Different Services Coming from the 
Bottom Three Quartiles of Each Year's Nominal MPCE Distribution (%) 
 RURAL URBAN 
 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
Education 49.73 36.21 39.13 41.12 42.56 45.13 51.51 43.67 
Healthcare 23.92 24.50 28.78 33.81 28.55 13.97 24.67 28.12 
Personal Services 38.47 24.93 33.30 34.64 53.42 46.27 57.87 60.79 
Entertainment 49.97 39.29 45.62 46.17 53.77 43.86 54.04 55.82 
Transportation 41.63 36.57 39.42 42.73 44.95 51.64 55.31 56.95 
ALL SERVICES 40.07 31.38 36.91 39.04 45.76 45.86 54.66 54.48 
Source: authors' calculation from unit level data from the various rounds of the NSS. Note: all 
computations use sampling weights. 
 
Let us start with data on total services that is presented in the last row of Table 1. For 
rural households in our sample, 40.07% of the total per capita expenditure on services in 1993-
94 came from the bottom 3 quartiles of the MPCE distribution. This declined to 31.38% in 2004-
05, but then climbed back up to 39.04% in 2011-12. For urban households in our sample, the 
picture is different both in terms of levels and trends. In 1993-94, 45.76% of total per capita 
expenditure on services came from the bottom 3 quartiles of households. While this increased 
mildly to 45.86% in 2004-05, it increased sharply thereafter to reach 54.48% in 2011-12. 
The same trend is also visible for individual service categories. For rural households in 
our sample, the proportion of per capita expenditure on healthcare and transportation that 
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comes from the bottom 3 quartiles of the MPCE distribution increased between 1993-94 and 
2011-12; for education, personal services and entertainment, the corresponding figure declined 
(with education witnessing the largest decline). For the urban households in our sample, the 
proportion of per capita expenditure arising from the expenditures of the bottom 75% of the 
MPCE distribution increased between 1993-94 and 2011-12 for healthcare, personal services, 
entertainment, and transportation, with personal services and transportation witnessing the 
largest increases. For education, the corresponding figures remained relatively unchanged over 
this period. 
Thus, the data in Table 1 demonstrate that poorer sections of households in both rural 
and urban India is a significant source of demand for the output of key service sector industries. 
Close to 40% of the economy-wide total of per capita expenditure on services in rural India 
come from the spending decisions of the bottom 75% of the MPCE distribution. In urban India, 
the significance of the expenditures of poorer households is even more pronounced. About 
55% of the economy-wide per capita expenditure on services in urban India come from the 
expenditures of the bottom 3 quartiles of the MPCE distribution. While this is about 28% for 
education services (the lowest among the 5 categories studied in this paper), it is as high as 61% 
for personal services in 2011-12. Thus, it would be incorrect to think that expenditure on 
services is primarily accounted for by the rich; the poor, especially in urban areas, account for a 
large proportion of the economy-wide (per capita) expenditure on services. Importantly, the 
share of the poor has not been falling, as would have happened if the demand for services in 
the boom period had been driven by the rich alone.      
 
3.2. Consumption of Services across MPCE Deciles 
The relatively faster growth in the household expenditure on services, in comparison to overall 
expenditure, was reflected in its rising share in household budgets. This has been the case for 
an average household. Was this increase restricted to richer sections of the population? To 
answer this question we present data in Table 2 on the average share of services in the 
household budget across MPCE deciles.  For calculations reported in Table 2, we define deciles 
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on the basis of the nominal MPCE distribution for each year and within each year, for rural and 
urban areas, separately. Thus, for instance, the decile cut-offs for rural households in 2004-05 
would be different not only from the cut-offs for urban households in 2004-05 but also for rural 
households in other years.  
Table 2: Share of Services in Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (%) across Each Year's 
Nominal MPCE Deciles 
 RURAL URBAN 
 MPCE 
Deciles 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
1 3.71 3.53 5.22 6.42 4.74 4.19 6.77 7.90 
2 3.77 4.18 6.58 7.49 5.30 5.63 8.18 9.86 
3 4.01 4.74 7.31 8.35 5.82 6.61 9.88 10.95 
4 4.47 5.27 7.91 8.88 6.70 7.68 11.06 11.94 
5 4.75 5.71 8.61 9.51 7.23 9.29 12.23 12.53 
6 5.08 6.26 9.40 10.68 7.95 10.63 13.10 13.05 
7 5.61 6.87 10.45 10.68 8.65 12.94 14.87 14.80 
8 6.05 8.06 11.01 11.43 10.34 14.84 15.33 14.95 
9 7.19 9.99 11.64 12.94 11.77 16.16 17.09 16.17 
10 9.89 13.29 14.04 14.62 16.22 20.90 19.30 19.47 
All Hhlds 5.25 6.25 8.64 9.56 8.14 11.68 13.21 13.47 
Source: authors' calculation from unit level data from the various rounds of the NSS. 
Note: MPCE deciles are defined on nominal MPCE for rural and urban areas separately 
for each year. All computations use sampling weights. 
 
The data in Table 2 highlight three interesting trends. First, on average, households have 
continually increased the share of their monthly budget for purchasing services: in rural India, 
the share of services increased from 5.25% in of household budgets in 1993-94 to 9.56% in 
2011-12; in urban India, the corresponding increase was from 8.14% in 1993-94 to 13.47% in 
2011-12. Second, for any year we observe an increasing trend in the average share of services 
expenditure in household budgets as we move from poorer to richer households. This is a well-
known trend and reflects the fact that poorer households have to spend a larger share of their 
budgets on other necessary items. Third, as we move across years we see an increase in the 
average share of services in the household budget across all MPCE deciles. This means that, for 
both rural and urban India, the average share of expenditure on services for households in any 
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(nominal) MPCE decile in any time period was higher than the corresponding average for 
households in the same (nominal) MPCE decile in a previous time period. Thus, the increase in 
the average share of services in the household budget is not restricted to any particular section, 
e.g., rich households, of the population when we define relative position in any year with 
respect to the distribution of total expenditures in that particular year. Using such a definition 
of rich/poor, the vast majority of households display the same trend of devoting an increasing 
share of their household budget on services.   
While the pattern seen in Table 2 is striking, it needs to be interpreted with caution. This 
is because of two reasons: (a) the group of households that occupy a given (nominal) MPCE 
decile in some period is different from those that occupy the same (nominal) MPCE decile in a 
subsequent (and previous) period; and, (b) since the early 1990s, India has witnessed relatively 
rapid income growth so that income (and expenditure) levels of households have generally 
increased over time. The first reason comes from the fact that the NSS does not collect a panel 
data set, i.e., the same household is not interviewed at different points in time. Instead, for 
every round, a different stratified random sample is used for collecting data. The second reason 
is important to keep in mind because households generally increase their budget share of non-
food, of which services is a component, as they become richer. This trend is observed for 
households across the world and arises from the fact that services are luxuries, with income 
elasticities greater than unity.5 Thus, to investigate if anything unexpected is going on with 
regard to household expenditure patterns in India, it is essential to control for income variation 
over time (and across space). 
Since the absence of a panel data set prevents us from tracking the same household 
over time, we adopt an indirect way to control for income variation (over time and space). We 
compare (groups of) households with similar real incomes levels at different points in time and 
space, where we compute real expenditure by deflating nominal expenditures by the state-
level CPIAL for rural and state-level CPIIW for urban households. In Table 3, we present 
                                                          
5 We use total expenditure (MPCE) as a proxy for income. We do so because the NSS does not collect data on 
income of households. 
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estimates of average share of service expenditure in household budgets for rural and urban 
households across inflation adjusted MPCE deciles.  
Note that Table 3 is similar to Table 2 with the sole and important difference being the 
manner in which the deciles are calculated. To prepare the estimates in Table 2, decile cut-offs 
had been defined for the nominal MPCE distribution pertaining to rural/urban India for each 
year separately. Hence, since average MPCE increased over the years, the decile cut-offs also 
increased over the years. For the calculations reported in Table 3, we define decile cut-offs on 
the basis of real MPCE for the pooled sample of households from all the four years. We do this 
separately for the sample of rural and urban households. The important point of this exercise is 
that the decile cut-offs do not change over the years. Thus, when we compare estimates of the 
average share of services expenditure in household budgets across years, we are able to 
compare groups of households with similar levels of real income.  
One way to understand our procedure is to note that any decile defined on the basis of 
real MPCE for the pooled sample of households will include households from all the four years. 
For instance, the first decile will have households with real MPCE lower than the first decile cut-
off. In general this condition will be satisfied by households from all the four years in our 
sample. Hence, the first (or any other) real MPCE decile will have households from 1993-94, 
2004-05, 2009-10 and 2011-12. Now, for all households in the first (or any other) real MPCE 
decile, we compute the average share of service expenditure by time periods. Since all 
households within the first (or any other) decile of real MPCE have similar real MPCE, this gives 
us an indirect way of answering the following question: do (groups of) households behave 
differently over time with respect to their expenditure on services even when their income 
level(s) do not change too much?  
Table 3 shows that the answer to the above question is generally in the affirmative. For 
instance, the average share of household budget devoted to services increased from 3.68% in 
1993-94 to 6.14% in 2011-12 for rural households in our sample with real income in the bottom 
most decile. For the analogous group of urban households, the corresponding increase was 
from 5.05% in 1993-94 to 8.10% in 2011-12. If we move to the other end of the real MPCE 
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distribution we see the same pattern of increase over time but with an important difference: 
the magnitude of increase is much lower. For instance, for the top most decile in rural India, 
average share of household budget on services increased from 11.67% in 1993-94 to 13.17% in 
2011-12. In urban India, the increase at the top is even lower: from 17.69% in 1993-94 to 
18.68% in 2011-12. Moreover, if we compare 2004-05 and 2011-12, the increase is even lower 
for rural areas and is reversed for urban India. For the top most decile in rural India, the share 
of household budget devoted to services barely increased from 13.06% in 2004-05 to 13.17% in 
2011-12. In urban India, the corresponding share goes down from 21.62% in 2004-05 to 18.68% 
in 2011-12. The pattern of decline is true for deciles 7 through 10 in urban India.     
Table 3: Share of Services in Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (%) across Real MPCE 
Deciles for Pooled Data 
 RURAL URBAN 
Real 
MPCE 
Deciles 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
1 3.68 3.57 5.22 6.14 5.05 5.00 7.37 8.10 
2 3.99 4.23 6.09 6.37 5.83 7.02 8.87 9.81 
3 4.47 4.70 6.89 7.25 6.71 8.17 10.46 10.48 
4 4.76 5.23 7.55 7.46 7.31 10.07 11.16 11.73 
5 5.27 5.53 8.01 7.98 8.23 11.22 12.32 12.20 
6 5.66 6.12 8.67 8.52 9.10 12.42 13.27 12.58 
7 6.34 6.79 9.82 8.91 10.10 14.31 14.35 13.98 
8 6.94 7.99 10.24 9.97 11.44 15.30 15.61 14.73 
9 8.38 9.40 11.03 11.03 13.21 17.36 17.06 15.66 
10 11.67 13.06 13.32 13.17 17.69 21.62 19.27 18.68 
All Hhlds 5.25 6.25 8.64 9.56 8.14 11.68 13.21 13.47 
Source: authors' calculation from unit level data from the various rounds of the NSS. 
Note: Real MPCE deciles are defined on the basis of the distribution of real MPCE pooled 
for all years, separately for rural and urban areas. All computations use sampling 
weights. 
 
Let us summarize the evidence presented in this section so far by highlighting two 
important points. First, we have shown that the sole source of demand for key services is not 
only the richer sections of the population; in fact, a large part of the total demand is arising 
from expenditure made by poorer sections of the population too, and this is especially 
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important in urban India. Second, we have shown that the increasing purchases of services by 
households – especially poorer households – is larger than what can be accounted for purely by 
the growth of income. This is because groups of households with similar levels of real income 
have increased the share of their monthly budget for services over the years. Moreover, this 
patterns seems to be relatively stronger at lower ends of the MPCE distribution.    
 
4. Are Poor Households Becoming Like the Rich? 
The evidence presented in the previous section highlights two patterns. First, on average, the 
share of household expenditure devoted to services has gone up over time in both rural and 
urban India (Table 2). Second, the average increase over time is driven by very different 
patterns for rich and poor households. For poorer households, the share has increased over 
time, even as it has decreased for rich households, especially since 2004-05 and in urban India. 
This suggests that the difference in the behaviour of rich and poor households with respect to 
expenditure on services – as captured by the share of household budget used for services – has 
narrowed down over time. In this section, we will present two types of evidence to support this 
claim about the narrowing down of difference between the behaviour of rich and poor 
households: bivariate nonparametric relationship between real MPCE and share of services; 
quadratic Engel curves for share of services.  
 
4.1. Lowess Plots 
The first pieces of evidence we would like to present are the bivariate relationship between the 
share of services share and real MPCE for the entire distribution of real MPCE for each 
particular year. In Figure 1 and 2, we present this relationship using Lowess plots of the share of 
services in MPCE on the logarithm of real MPCE for rural and urban India respectively. These 
Lowess plots are computed through locally weighted bivariate regression of the share of 
services in MPCE on the logarithm of real MPCE. This method was first proposed by Cleveland 
(1979) and has been widely used since then as a flexible method for capturing bivariate 
relationships among random variables. Being a local smoothing technique, it is sensitive to 
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variations in the bivariate relationship at all points in the distribution of the independent 
variable. 
 
Figure 1: Lowess plot (with a bandwidth of 0.4) of the share of monthly per capita expenditure 
(MPCE) on services (excluding rent) and log-real MPCE in Rural India. Source: authors’ 
calculation from unit level data from the NSS. To exclude outliers, the top and bottom 1 percent 
of the log-real MPCE distribution for each year has been dropped.  
 
Two important patterns can be observed in the Lowess plots in Figure 1 and 2. First, 
they show that the share of services in MPCE and the logarithm of real MPCE are positively 
related for every year in both rural and urban India. Thus, as households become richer, they 
spend a larger share of their monthly budget on services. Second, the Lowess plots shift over 
time in interesting ways. Between 1993-94 and 2004-05, Lowess curves for both rural and 
urban India pivot anti-clockwise. Thus, curve shifts down at the left end of the real MPCE 
distribution, and the rest of the curve shifts up. This anti-clockwise shift of the Lowess curve 
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between 1993-94 and 2004-05 is much more pronounced in urban that in rural India. Between 
2004-05 and 2009-10, the Lowess curve for rural India shifts up in an almost parallel manner. 
Over the same period, the Lowess curve for urban India pivots in a clockwise direction. This 
clockwise movement leads the Lowess curves for the two years to intersect. Between 2009-10 
and 2011-12, the Lowess curves for both rural and urban India pivot in a clockwise direction.      
 
 
Figure 1: Lowess plot (with a bandwidth of 0.4) of the share of monthly per capita expenditure 
(MPCE) on services (excluding rent) and log-real MPCE in Urban India. Source: authors’ 
calculation from unit level data from the NSS. To exclude outliers, the top and bottom 1 percent 
of the log-real MPCE distribution for each year has been dropped. 
 
These two Lowess plots suggest an interesting fact. In urban India, the consumption 
pattern of the poor with regard to services – as measured by the share of monthly expenditure 
devoted to services – have increasingly resembled the pattern of the rich since 2004-05. This is 
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because the Lowess curve for urban India has pivoted in a clockwise direction, so that the 
difference in the monthly expenditure share for services for the upper and lower ends of the 
real MPCE distribution has narrowed down. While pattern is observed for urban India since 
2004-05, it is observed for rural India since 2009-10.  
 
4.2. Quadratic Engel Curves 
While the Lowess curve are extremely informative and give us an idea about the changing 
relationship between the share of services and real MPCE, its main disadvantage is that it is a 
bivariate relationship. Hence, the Lowess curves are not able to control for other factors that 
might impact both the share of services and real MPCE so that the bivariate relationship 
estimated and presented in the Lowess curves might be biased. To control for other relevant 
factors, we supplement the Lowess plots with results from regression analysis.  
In moving to a regression analysis, we are able to draw on a vast body of literature that 
has studied Engel curves (for instance, see Lewbel, 2008). Engel curves capture a crucial aspect 
of household behaviour: the relationship between expenditure on particular items or group of 
items and the household’s income or total expenditure. One of the most popular forms of the 
Engel curve is expressed as a relationship between budget shares (of items or groups of items) 
and total expenditure. Empirical studies of the budget share Engel curve have often used the 
Working-Leser model, where budget share of an item (or group of items) is a linear function of 
log-expenditure (Working, 1943; Leser, 1963). In this paper, we will use this popular 
specification – the Working-Leser model – of the Engel curve. 
In estimating Engel curves, at least four issues need to be addressed. The first issue 
relates to the appropriate functional form. Even though the early literature used a linear 
specification of the Working-Leser model, many researchers have argued that a quadratic 
specification is more appropriate for various reasons, like allowing for potential nonlinearities 
(Banks et al., 1997). In this paper, we follow the recent literature in estimating a quadratic form 
of the Engel curve. The second issue relates to the use of other covariates in the model. While 
some papers have used bivariate specifications – budget share regressed on a constant and log 
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expenditure – it is now common to control for other households level characteristics, especially 
demographic factors. In this paper, we follow this literature and include extensive demographic 
controls in the model. 
The third issue pertains to the zero-expenditure problem (Deaton and Irish, 1984). This 
problem arises because households often report zero consumption of many goods and services. 
If a large proportion of households report zero expenditure for the item under investigation, 
then ignoring this feature of the setting might give rise to biased estimates. On the other hand, 
it is often difficult to identify the exact reason for the reported zero expenditure. It could arise 
because of non-consumption or because of low frequency of purchase or measurement error. 
Hence, it becomes difficult to address the zero expenditure problem. In this paper, we could 
avoid the problem of zero expenditure because our main variable of interest is the composite 
category of services. While many households reported zero expenditure for individual items, 
very few households reported zero expenditure for all items. Hence, for none of the years did 
we have a sample with more than 5 percent zero expenditure. Since a rule of thumb is to 
address the zero expenditure problem only when more than 10 percent of sample households 
fall in that category, we ignored the issue (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The final issue relates to the potential problem of endogeneity. In the Working-Leser 
model, the dependent variable is budget share of an item (or a group of items) and the key 
independent variable is log-expenditure. Since expenditure on an item (or group of items) is 
jointly determined with total expenditure, the key independent variable in the model is likely to 
be endogenous. Hence, estimating the model with OLS is likely to produce biased an 
inconsistent parameter estimates. In this paper, we address this potential problem by using two 
instruments for log-real expenditure: amount of land owned for potentially productive 
purposes, and educational attainment of the household head.  
To construct the instruments, we use relevant data from the CES. For the first 
instrument – amount of land owned for potentially productive purposes – we use information 
from two questions in the CES questionnaire: (1) whether the household owns any land?, and 
(2) if it owns land, which of the following three types does it fall into: (a) homestead only, (b) 
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homestead and other land, and (c) other land only. If any household owns land of type (b) or 
(c), we count that as “land owned for potentially productive purposes”. For the second 
instrument – educational attainment of household head – we use information about the 
“general educational level” of the household head. The educational level is measured as a 
categorical variable with the following 6 categories: not literate, literate but without formal 
schooling, literate but below primary school, primary school, middle school, secondary school 
and above. 
To function as a valid instrument, a variable must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be 
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable (the relevance condition). Second, it must 
impact the dependent variable only through its effect on the endogenous variable (the 
exogeneity condition). We think that the first condition is satisfied because the amount of land 
owned for productive purposes is a proxy for wealth, and educational attainment of the 
household head is a proxy for “human capital”. Thus, both instruments are likely to be strongly 
correlated with household income and total expenditure so that the relevance condition would 
be satisfied. We think that the second condition is satisfied because wealth and human capital 
are largely pre-determined at the time the households undertake monthly expenditure 
decisions. Hence, the exogeneity condition is likely to be satisfied. While these intuitive reasons 
suggest that the instruments might be valid, we will report results from statistical tests to 
ascertain them more rigorously – first stage results for the relevance condition and 
overidentification test for the exogeneity condition.       
Keeping in mind these four points, we estimate the following model in this paper: 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜸𝜸′𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖     (1) 
where 𝑖𝑖 indexes households, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 denotes the share of MPCE spent on services, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes log-
real MPCE, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
2denotes the square of log-real MPCE, 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 refers to a vector of demographic 
controls that include number of male adults, number of female adults, number of male 
children, number of female children, age and age-squared of the household head, caste of the 
household, religion of the household head, and a dummy variable for female-headed 
households, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 denotes an unobserved stochastic error term. To address the potential 
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problem of endogeneity of log-real MPCE, we instrument it with the amount of land owned for 
productive purposes, and educational attainment of the household head. We estimate the 
parameters of the model for each of the thick rounds of the CES separately with 2SLS and 
report the results in Table 4. Since we estimate the model separately for each time period, we 
do not need to account for the temporal variation in prices. But, following Kedir and Girma 
(2007), we control for spatial variation in prices by deflating MPCE by relevant state-level 
consumer price indexes. 
Let us start from the last two rows of Table 4, which present results for the validity of 
the two instruments. A large p-value of the overidentification test suggests that the exogeneity 
condition is satisfied and a large value of the F-stat for the first stage regression – a rule of 
thumb is that the F-stat should be greater than 10 – suggests that the relevance condition is 
satisfied. From the results reported in the last two rows we see that the estimation for urban 
India is strongly valid – the p-values of the overidentifcation tests are large and the F-stats for 
the first stage regressions are much larger than 10 –but that the results for rural India are weak. 
For rural India, the overidentifcation test fails in 2004-05 and the relevance condition fails for 
every time period. Thus, we do not have lot of confidence on the results for rural India. So, in 
the rest of the paper, we will focus on urban India. 
The results for urban India in Table 4 show that the coefficient on log-real MPCE is 
greater than zero (and strongly significant) for all time periods. For instance, the coefficient for 
1993-94 suggests that a 1 percent increase in real MPCE is associated with a 0.87 percent 
increase in the share of services in household budgets. This finding about the response of 
spending on services to income (or total expenditure) is in accord with existing results (Nayyar, 
2012). Interestingly, the coefficient on the quadratic term is always negative and significant. 
This suggests that at the upper end of the MPCE distribution, i.e., for rich households, services 
are not considered luxuries. Our finding of the importance of nonlinear behavior is in line with 
much of the existing literature on Engel curves (Banks et al., 1997; Kedir and Girma, 2007). But 
this is not the focus of our paper; so we will not pursue the question further.  
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Table 4: Quadratic Engel Curve Estimates for Services Excluding Rent 
 RURAL URBAN 
 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 
         
Dependent Variable: Proportion of MPCE on Services (excluding Rent)     
         
Log Real MPCE -1.884* 0.368 2.195** 2.411* 0.869*** 0.968*** 0.678*** 0.476** 
 (0.732) (0.408) (0.764) (1.009) (0.225) (0.120) (0.075) (0.158) 
Log Real MPCE-
Squared 0.295** -0.045 -0.302** -0.314* -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.077*** -0.051** 
 (0.112) (0.059) (0.110) (0.137) (0.031) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) 
Constant 3.000* -0.674 -3.860** -4.479* -1.607*** -1.896*** -1.316*** -0.936** 
 (1.178) (0.697) (1.314) (1.845) (0.404) (0.218) (0.144) (0.319) 
         
Observations 56317 60752 46467 46830 36535 23742 24567 24681 
Overid Test (p-value) 0.146 0.000 0.633 0.218 0.254 0.986 0.307 0.585 
First Stage (F-Stat) 3.228 2.998 4.690 3.109 28.662 34.068 36.293 58.142 
Note: In all regression, log Real MPCE is instrumented by educational attainment of household head and land owned for productive 
purposes; demographic variables include number of male and female adults, number of male and female children, age, caste and 
religion of household head, age of household head squared, and whether the house is female headed. Standard errors are clustered by 
state-regions and appear in parentheses below estimates. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use sampling weights. 
 
  
24 
 
Our main interest in estimating Engel curves is to see how they change over time, and to 
infer from these changes the difference in the behaviour between relatively rich and poor 
households. The result for urban India shows that between 1993-94 and 2004-05 the Engel 
curve pivoted in a counter-clockwise direction. The intercept slipped down from -1.61 to -1.9 
and the slope increased from 0.87 to 0.97. But, the pattern is reversed thereafter. Between 
2004-05 and 2009-10, and then again between 2009-10 and 2011-12, the Engel curve pivots in 
a clockwise direction. Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, the intercept goes up from -1.9 to -1.32 
and the slope falls from 0.97 to 0.68; between 2009-10 and 2011-12, the intercept goes up 
further from -1.32 to -0.94 and the slope falls further from 0.68 to 0.48. Thus, the Engel curve 
estimation results support the pattern observed in the Lowess curve shifts: since 2004-05, the 
behaviour of the relatively rich and poor households with respect to service expenditure have 
increasingly converged.  
         
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented evidence that the consumption of services has increased rapidly 
in India since 1993-94. Both in terms of average real expenditure on key services and as a share 
of monthly budgets devoted to services, households have increased the purchase of the output 
of India’s service sector. There is something paradoxical about this. For a low income country like 
India it seems unlikely that most households can afford to set aside an increasingly large portion 
of their budgets for consumption of services when consumption of basic necessities like food 
remain unmet. Not only do the majority of households fall below the Indian Council of Medical 
Research norms for calorie intake in any year, there has been a decline in calorie intake over time 
(Basole and Basu, 2015).  
Given this paradoxical situation, two hypotheses have been proposed to explain the 
increase in the average household demand for services. The first hypothesis suggests that 
because of worsening income distribution, the bulk of the benefit of income growth is going to 
the rich. The rich have a high income elasticity of demand for services. Hence, they are spending 
an increasingly larger share of their rapidly growing income on services, which is driving up the 
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demand for services. The important point to note is that in this case demand is coming primarily 
from the rich. The second hypothesis suggests that people’s preference for services is rising over 
time due to greater availability, rising consumerism, and other relevant factors. Both these 
factors have been commented upon by Rakshit (2007), and these may very well be important 
contributors.  
In this paper we have examined a third hypothesis: spending on services by the poor 
increasingly resemble the spending pattern of the rich. We have presented evidence from Lowess 
plots (Figure 1 and 2) and quadratic Engel curves (Table 4) as evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. The important implication of this evidence is that high demand for services can arise 
even without rising inequality in the distribution of income. This is because demand, according 
to our hypothesis, is generated by the poor as well as the rich. 
Of course the evidence presented in this paper could also be interpreted as a change in 
the preference of the poor. If that is the case, it is similar to the second hypothesis noted 
above. However, we prefer to be cautious here. Usually change in a consumer’s preference, 
which affects her expenditure, is taken as a voluntary behavioural change. But naive truism 
seems unwarranted here. In a sense, every purchase is voluntary (unless the customer is made 
to make a purchase at gunpoint). If such a view is subscribed to, one will not able to distinguish 
between cases where a consumer buys something because she is affluent enough to do so, and 
cases where she is buying it because she is poor but must buy it to survive. Both cases appear 
to be voluntary decisions to the naïve empiricist. What gets lost in the second case is the 
possible element of coercion. For our purpose here, if the poor are behaving more like the rich 
with respect to services consumption it could be due to their vulnerability and helplessness.  
There are at least three possible mechanisms that could contribute to this vulnerability, 
we discuss them below as hypotheses that could be investigated in future research.  
First, since the late 1980s, the Indian government has adopted a set of policies that have 
a pronounced neoliberal orientation. As part of this policy “reform”, growth in public 
provisioning of education, healthcare, housing and other essential services has been checked. 
Shariff et al. (2002) report that public expenditure on education, which rose as a share of GNP 
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between 1950-51 and 1990-91, has stagnated since then. Bhat and Jain (2004) find that public 
healthcare expenditure as a percentage of state GDP has gone down in major states between 
1990 and 2002. Comparing the pre-reform (1980-1991) to the post-reform (1991-2001) period, 
Joshi (2006) notes that average developmental expenditure, as a share of total expenditure, has 
fallen for both the Central and State governments. These declines in public expenditures on 
items which are essential in nature, may have forced households to substitute private for public 
provisioning, leading to increasing demands on the household budget.  
Second, structural transformation of the Indian economy has impacted access by 
households to key common property resources, like forests, rivers, grazing grounds. This loss 
has been reflected in rising expenditures on goods and services that are no longer available 
from the commons. For instance, Basole and Basu (2015) report that the proportion of rural 
households using commercial sources of fuel – which includes coke & coal, LPG, electricity, 
kerosene and charcoal – has more than tripled from around 5% in 1987-88 to 16% in 2009-10. 
In a similar vein, NSS data reveals that in the short duration from 1993-94 to 1998, the 
percentage of households using firewood declined from 87% to 62% (NSSO, 1999).   
Third, agrarian distress and growth of the informal sector have been two notable 
developments in recent times. Kotwal et al. (2011) have contrasted employment growth in 
organized and unorganized manufacturing sectors. In the former, employment growth fell from 
1.08% per annum between 1983 and 1993-94, to -0.38% per annum between 1993-94 and 
2004-05. In the latter employment growth rose from 2.3% per annum to 4.26% during the same 
period. Kar and Marjit (2009) highlighted the rising share of unorganized sector employment in 
total employment since the late 1970s. Informalization might have increased migration. This 
might have been exacerbated by distress in the rural hinterland (Rodgers and Rodgers, 2001). 
Increased migration has, in turn, led to increased expenditures on transportation, 
communication, rent, and other such services.  
Many of these transformations are of a structural nature. While such structural changes 
are beyond the control of households, they do entail changes in their expenditure patterns 
related to services.  Hence, it would be incorrect to attribute the growth of expenditure by 
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relatively poorer households to voluntary choice alone. Thus, it might not be altogether amiss 
to identify an important source of growth of the service sector in India with compulsions, rather 
than the affluence, of the poor.  
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Appendix 
In this appendix we provide detailed information on the items that have been included in 
various categories of the services expenditure and their identification according to the “item 
code number” in various rounds of NSS data. 
 
CATEGORY ITEM NAMES ITEM CODE NUMBER IN NSS DATA 
  1993-94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
EDUCATION LIBRARY CHARGES 652 402 403 403 
TUITION, OTHER FEES (SCHOOL, COLEGE 
ETC.) 654 404 405 405 
PRIVATE TUTOR, COACHING CENTRE 655 405 406 406 
OTHER EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES 
(INCLUDING ENROLLMENT IN WEB-
BASED TRAINING) 658 406 408 408 
HEALTHCARE X-RAY, ECG, PATHOLOGICAL TEST ETC.  671 411 411 411 
DOCTOR'S/SURGEON'S FEES 672, 673 412 412 412 
HOSPITAL, NURSING HOME CHARGES 674, 675 413 413 413 
OTHER MEDICAL EXPENSES 678 414 414 414 
X-RAY, ECG, PATHOLOGICAL TEST ETC. 
(NON-INSTITUTIONAL) 662 421 421 421 
DOCTOR'S/SURGEON'S FEES (NON-
INSTITUTIONAL) 663, 664 422 422 422 
OTHER MEDICAL EXPENSES (NON-
INSTITUTIONAL) 668 424 424 424 
ENTERTAINMENT CINEMA, THEATRE 520 430 430 430 
MELA, FAIR, PICNIC 521 431 431 431 
CLUB FEES 523 433 433 433 
VCD/DVD HIRE 528 436 436 436 
CABLE TV 528 437 437 437 
OTHER ENTERTAINMENT 528 438 438 438 
RENT HOUSE RENT, GARAGE RENT (ACTUAL) 630 520 520 520 
HOTEL LODGING CHARGES 630 520 521 521 
RESIDENTIAL LAND RENT 631 521 522 522 
OTHER CONSUMER RENT 632 522 523 523 
HOUSE RENT, GARAGE RENT (IMPUTED-
URBAN ONLY) 630 539 539 539 
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CATEGORY ITEM NAMES ITEM CODE NUMBER IN NSS DATA 
  1993-94 
2004-
05 
2009-
10 
2011-
12 
PERSONAL 
SERVICES 
DOMESTIC SERVANT/COOK 580 480 480 480 
ATTENDANT 580 480 481 481 
SWEEPER 581 481 482 482 
BARBER, BEAUTICIAN, ETC. 582 482 483 483 
WASHERMAN, LAUNDRY, 
IRONING 583 483 484 484 
TAILOR 584 484 485 485 
GRINDING CHARGES 592 492 486 486 
TELEPHONE CHARGES, LANDLINE 590 488 487 487 
TELEPHONE CHARGES, MOBILE 590 488 488 488 
POSTAGE & TELEGRAM 587 487 490 490 
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES 592 492 491 491 
PRIEST 585 485 492 492 
LEGAL EXPENSES 586 486 493 493 
REPAIR CHARGES FOR NON-
DURABLES 592 490 494 494 
INTERNET EXPENSES 590 488 496 496 
OTHER CONSUMER SERVICES 
EXCLUDING CONVEYANCE 598 494 496 497 
TRANSPORTATION AIRFARE 600 500 500 500 
RAILWAY FARE 601 501 501 501 
BUS/TRAM FARE 602 502 502 502 
TAXI, AUTO-RICKSHAW FARE 603 503 503 503 
STEAMER, BOAT FARE 604 504 504 504 
RICKSHAW FARE 605 505 505 505 
HORSE CART FARE 607, 606, 610 506 506 506 
PORTER CHARGES 611 507 507 507 
SCHOOL BUS, VAN, ETC. 616 512 512 512 
OTHER CONVEYANCE EXPENSES 618 513 513 513 
 
 
 
